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This project attempts to investigate the movement of the 
real exchange rate of the Deutschemark against the US 
dollar in the three years after German Economic and 
Monetary Union ( GEMU )• The basic forecasting tool is the 
“ Purchasing Power Parity" theory applied in a monetary 
approach. Two scenarios are examined to see how the real 
exchange rate will go by fitting into the model developed. 
The scenarios depend on whether the Bundesbank will tighten 
credit. 
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The German Economic and Monetary Union ( GEMU ) took place 
on July 1, 1990. The outcome of the Union will have 
crucial importance to both the German and world economic 
scenes. The Bundesbank Council, at its meeting attended by 
Financial Minister Theo Waigel on March 29, 1990, detailed 
its preferred plan for GEMU, a plan which was subsequently 
released on April 2, 1990 ( A summary of the plan is 
shown in Exhibit 1 )• In essence, under its plan all 
Ostmark flows ( such as wages and pensions ) and m o s t 
stocks ( such as corporate liabilities and all savings 
over OM 2,000.- per person ) were converted at a rate of 
one Deutschemark for every two Ostmarks. Furthermore, West-
German pensions, unemployment and other social security 
benefits and contributions were introduced immediately. 
VAT and other indirect taxes on West German lines came in 
straight away, income and corporate taxes in January 1991• 
East German industry and commerce, previously owned by the 
government, has been vested in a trust fund ( 
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"Treuhandgesellschaft" ). which has already concluded some 
sales that became effective on July 1, 1990. The practical 
effect is that many East German shops, for example, became 
outlets of the large German retail chain on July 1st. 
Western goods, already creeping in before July 1 , 9 0 , are 
rapidly replace the low quality East German goods 
previously on sale. 
On these dramatic changes, there are different viewpoints 
as to the possible effect of the GEMU will the new 
Germany be as strong or even stonger than West Germany 
before Union ？ Or will the strength of the German economy 
be given up to help to re—construct the less—developed East 
Germany ？ 
If we look at the dark side of the issue, according to 
analysts in both East and West Germany, less than one-third 
of East German companies will be able to survive the 
transition without some help. At the same time, with wages 
in East Germany likely to rise substantially ( or else 
workers will all move West ), the number of unemployed 
workers is projected to reach two million, around one-




Financial Market Research. (October 1990), Manufacturers 
Hanover Corp. 
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Concerns among West Germans are that payment for this will 
mean higher taxes and lower living standards. Although it 
is impossible to determine the additional strain that 
financing German unity will place on West Germany‘s public 
sector, the Bonn government estimates this cost at around 
50 billion Deutschemarks ( or about USD 30 billion ) per 
1 
year. Given the Bundesbank's firm anti—inflation stance, 
the rise in public spending is highly unlikely to be 
financed by printing money. The other resorts will be tax 
raises and increased government borrowing. These will 
inevitably result in higher German interest rates. As 
a matter of fact, the Bundesbank had raised the Lombard 
rate from 8 percent to 8.50 percent on Nov 1, 90 reflecting 
the tightness of funding after the Union. ( The last 
move before that was a rise in the discount rate on Oct 5, 
1989. ) On Jan 31 1991, there was another hike that 
brought the Lombard rate from 8.5 % to 9 %, and the 
2 
discount rate from 6% to 6.5 %. 
Yet if we look at the bright side of the re—unification, 
the financial cost incurred will only be temporary. The 
two Germanies can be seen as complements to one another in 
terms of their resources, ( for example, the technology 
1 
Financial Digest. Vol XXVII, No. 23 (Nov 1990), 
Manufacturers Hanover Corp. , 
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Financial Market Research. March 1991, Manufacturers 
Hanover Corp. 
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level and the supply of labour ). On the other hand, West 
Germany has a substantial external surplus which allows 
rapid domestic demand growth with only a modest 
acceleration in inflation. The Bundesbank's reputation in 
monetary reform and inflation fighting brings hope that the 
Union will be another success. Therefore, there is also 
hope that the Union will bring new strength to Germany 
after a short adjustment process. 
No matter how the economy will be, one thing that is 
certain is that any change will ultimately reflect itself 
in the exchange rate. In short, a country with a strong 
economy will have a strong exchange rate and vice v e r s a . 
This is best explained by the "Theory of Purchasing Power 
Parity", in this project we will make use of this theory 
to see how the exchange rate will g〇 in three y e a r s . This 
time period is specified in order that short-term 
fluctuations can be overcome and the underlying main trend 




The three economic theories that are used in this analysis 
to project the change of exchange rates are : 
i. Purchasing power parity theory 
ii. Real exchange rate 
iii. Monetary approach 
PURCHASING POWER PARITY 
This theory proposes that exchange rates move primarily in 
response to the difference in price level behaviour and 
between the two countries in such a way that the terms of 
trade remain unchanged. The theory argues that exchange 
rate movements primarily reflect the divergent rate of 
inflation. In particular, the purchasing power parity 
relationship does hold in in the face of an increase in the 
money stock. If price level movements are caused by 
monetary changes - as they are likely to be if the 
inflation rate is high 一 then it is expected that in the 
1 
long run, purchasing power parity relation will hold. 
1 
Mark, Nelson C. Real and Nominal Exchange Rates in the Long Run 
丄 ^ Empirical Investiqation• Journal of InternatTonaT" Economics 
(Nederlands), Vol 28 (Feb 90), pp 115-136. 
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To represent the relationship mathematically : 
P � = r ( 2.1 ) 
where P^ and P^ denote the price level in country 1 and 2 
respectively , and r the exchange rate between the two 
countries. 
Yet there are two conditions that need to be satisfied 
before the relations will hold. Firstly, even a monetary 
distubance will affect the terms of trade in the short run. 
Exchange rates tend to move quite rapidly relative to price 
and therefore in the short run, it is not strange at all to 
see substantial deviation of exchange rates from those 
implied by the purchasing power parity t h e o r y . 
Secondly, there are other non-monetary disturbances which 
affect exchange rates at the same time. For e x a m p l e , an 
increase in exports will improve the terms of trade of the 
country and as a result lead to domestic currency 
appreciation relative to its trading p a r t n e r w i t h o u t a 
change in domestic price level. O r , if there is an 
increase in potential domestic output, the equilibrium 
terms of trade will worsen. To absorb the increased 
output, demand must be stimulated, which implies a decline 
in the relative price of the g o o d s . Thus it is apparent 
that, over time, adjustment to real d i s t u r b a n c e s will 
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affect the equilibrium terms of trade. As a result the 
exchange rate and price do not necessarily move together as 
they do if all sources of distubance are m o n e t a r y . On the 
contrary, there could be important changes in relative 
price which run counter to the purchasing power parity view 
of exchange rates. 
As an empirical matter, the purchasing power parity view of 
exchange rates will work well when, as frequently happens, 
monetary disturbance predominates. T h e r e f o r e , purchasing 
power parity theory is an important explanation of some 
large exchange rate movements. However not all exchange 
rate movements are caused by monetary disturbances and the 
purchasing power parity theory does not provide a good 
explanation for the short run behavior of exchange rate. 
It is because of this, in the analysis that follows, that 
the long run change in exchange rate is considered 
that is the effect of change for a period of three y e a r s . 
At the same time, the main source of disturbance will be 
monetary based, and we adopt the monetary approach of 
macro—economics to account for the disturbance. 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
As the price level expressed in the purchasing power parity 
relation carries different units, ( e.g one is measured in 
Deutschemark and the other in USD ) a conversion factor is 
involved to make the two price levels in comparable 
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units. The nominal and real exchange rate is defined here 
to incorporate the difference. When the real exchange rate 
is the concern, we refer to the ratio of a broadly based 
index of the foreign price level expressed in domestic 
currency unit. ( Through multiplication by the exchange 
rate ) to a similar index of the domestic price level. 
i.e. 
r = S*Pi ( 2.2 ) 
P2 
where r = real exchange rate 
S = nominal exchange rate 
Pi and P^ = Price level of country 1 and 2 respectively 
It can be seen that a change in real exchange rates 
actually reflects a discrepancy between the rate of change 
of nominal exchange rates and the difference between the 
domestic and foreign price level. The latter can be called 
the deviation from the purchasing power parity. 
The following characteristics of the real exchange rate can 
be observed : 
1. The real exchange rate appears to exhibit near constancy 
or mild trend, only over the long run. ( Purchasing power 
1 
E Claassen, and P Salin, Recent Issues iji Uie Theory of 
Flexible Exchange Rate. Amsterdam 7 ~ N ^ t h Holland 
Publishing, 1983. 
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parity holds approximately in the long run ) 
2. Real exchange rates are highly variable in the short 
run, suggesting that it is influenced by cyclical, or 
highly volatile, monetary variables in addition to longer 
term real force. 
3. Deviations of the real exchange rate from the trend 
exhibit strong positive serial correction — in other 
words, deviations from purchasing power parity are 
persistent. 
In addition, a number of associations between changes in 
real exchange rates and other variables appear to 
characterise their behaviour. Two of these are of 
particular interest : 
1) Changes in nominal and real exchange rate exhibits a 
strong correlation in the short run. Movement in 
nominal interest rates seem to dominate movements in 
real exchange rates. 
2) Movement in real exchange rates in turn appear to be 
correlated with deviation of output from trend. 
There are two distinctive applications of the concept of 
purchasing power parity in economics : 
1. There is the traditional view as a theory of exchange 
rate determination which is associated with the formulation 
11 
1 
originally developed by Gustav Cassel. 
2. A more recent application is to use it as a conversion 
factor to transform macro-economic data expressed in 
national currencies to some other currency denominator that 
is standard for all the countries involved in the 
comparison. 
In this project, it is the first view that is adopted. 
Whereas the OECD ( Organisation for Economic Co—operation 
and Development ) has conducted research in 1983-1984 to 
calculate the real GDP and associated purchasing power 
parities. The result of this study is shown in exhibit 2. 
MONETARY APPROACH 
In macro—economics, equilibrium is achieved by the 
interception of the so called IS and LM curves. The IS 
curve is the schedule of the combination of interest rates 
and level of income such that the goods m a r k e t is in 
equilibrium. In the IS relation, an increase in the 
interest rate reduces planned investment spending and 
therefore reduces aggregate demand, thus reducing the 
equilibrium level of income. 
1 
Lee, Moon H., Purchasing Power Parity. New York : Marcel 
Dekker Inc., 1976. 
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The LM curve is the schedule of combinations of the 
interest rate and the balance of income such that the money 
market is in equilibrium. When the money market is in 
equilibrium, so too is the bond m a r k e t . The LM curve, is 
therefore, also the schedule of combinations of the level 
of income and the interest rate such that the bond market 
is in equilibrium. In the purchasing power parity 
analysis, as it is the monetary disturbance that matters 
m o s t , the LM relation is used to incorporate the 
relationship between a change in price level and monetary 
disturbance. 
The LM relationship is derived as a result of demand for 
money equal to the supply of m o n e y . The demand for money 
depends on the level of real income and the interest rate. 
It depends on the level of real income because individual 
hold money to finance their expenditure, which in turn 
depends on how much they earn. Therefore the demand for 
money to finance regular spending on goods can be 
considered as the transactional demand for m o n e y . 
The demand for money also depends on the interest rate. 
The cost of holding money is the interest that is foregone 
by holding it rather than interest-bearing a s s e t s . The 
higher the interest rate, the more costly it is to hold 
money rather than other assets, and accordingly, the less 
cash will be held at each level of income. Individuals can 
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economize on the holding of cash when the interest rate 
rise, by being more carefully managing their money ； by 
transferring from cash to bonds whenever their money 
holding reaches any appreciable m a g n i t u d e . 
On these simple grounds, then, the demand for money can be 
seen to increase with the level of real income and decrease 
with the increase of the interest rate. To represent the 
relationship mathematically, 
L = kY - hi k>0 h>0 ( 2 . 3 ) 
where L = demand for real money 
Y = level of income 
i = interest rate 
The parameter h and k reflect the sensitivity of the demand 
for money to the level of income and the interest rate 
respectively. The demand function for money ( equation 2.3 
) implies that for a given level of income the demand for 




If the supply of money is affected, the nominal supply of 
money is controlled by the central b a n k s . Often the 
monetary policy is used as a tool to regulate the economy. 
The central banks fine tune the economic activities by 
adjusting the money supply and the official discount rate, 
and the emergency fund rate ( which is referred to as the 
Lombard rate in Germany and Switzerland, the unsecured call 
rate in Japan and the "Fed fund rate" in the United State 
)• As the impact of monetary policy is gradual and that 
the stability of the financial environment is also crucial 
to the policy maker, the monetary policy is not likely to 
change frequently. In the short run, it can be assumed 
that the nominal money supply • is fixed. In the long 
run, nominal money supply is variable depending on a 
central bank's monetary policy. The real supply of money 
is given by M/P, where P is the price level. 
The equilibrium in the money market requires that the 
supply for real money equals the demand for real m o n e y . 
Mathematically it is represented as : 
M/P = kY - hi ( 2.4 ) 
From the above relationship, the effect of the change in 
nominal money supply or interest rates have on the price 
level can be deduced. Assuming a constant income level, 
any increase in nominal supply of money will lead to an 
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increase in price level whereas an increase in interest 
rates will lead to a decrease in pirice level in order to 
restore equilibrium in the money m a r k e t . In the analysis 
thus followed, the sensitivity of demand to income level 
(k) and interest rate (h) is determined first. Then by 
considering different scenarios that could h a p p e n , the 
effect of different monetary policy on the price level is 
determined , and thus the exchange rate that resulted. 
EXPLAINING THE MODEL 
The analysis can be represented with the use of a four-
quadrant diagram. If a two sector model is a s s u m e d , then 
between country 1 and country 2, the equilibrium exchange 
rate is depicted as in diagram 1. 
In quadrants 工工 and IV of the figure, the demand for money 
in the two countries is shown as h y p e r b o l a e . Quadrant III 
shows that the relations between the price level 
( r = P^ ) at the original exchange rate as the rate O A . 
In Quadrant 工 the world money supply evaluated at the 
initial exchange rate is given by M^ and M? , where : 
M 2 = / r ( 2.5 ) 
If originally, equilibrium is at point E, where the money 





丨/pi ^ \ M , 
‘/p. 
Source : Bo Sodersten, International Economics. New York : 
Macmillan Press, 1979, pp. 378 - 386. 
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equilibrium relationships between price levels in the two 
countries is satisfied. 
Then if country 1 increases its money supply, the "budget 
line" in quadrant �� describing the world's monetary 
constraint, now shift outward from MM to M ' M ' . The effect 
of the monetary change will result in an increase in 
domestic price level, but no affect on the price level of 
country 2. So upon re-establishment of equilibrium at E', 
the currency of country 1 is depreciated relative to 
country 2. Diagammatically, the change is shown in 
diagram 2 . 
The effect of changing interest rates is somewhat more 
complicated. Normally, the change in interest rates is 
used as a tool to regulate the price level. If the price 
level goes up, the supply of real money, given by M / P , will 
be lowered. This will cause disequilibrium in the money 
market if the demand for real money remains u n c h a n g e d . To 
restore equilibrium, the government can raise the interest 
rate. In so doing, the opportunity cost of holding money 
for purchasing purposes will increase. People would rather 
put the money in interest-bearing accounts or invest in 
treasury bonds. As a result, the savings ratio will 
increase and the general public's incentive in holding 
money for purchasing purpose is discouraged, and the 
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19 
I � � � � �吁 ^ ^ � � • � I 
On the other hand, the policy maker can increase nominal 
money supply such that the overall supply of real money 
remain unchanged. However, the living standard of the 
economy is bid up and inflation could go uncontrolled. 
In this respect, the exchange rate of the country depends 
on what the policy maker wants to achieve. If a 
contractory monetary policy is adopted, the government will 
have a tight control on the money supply. At the same time 
the interest rate is likely to remain h i g h . The price 
level would remain at a relatively low level should 
equilibrium be reestablished. The purchasing power parity 
theory predicts that the currency of the country is likely 
to appreciate. 
Reducing the interest rate and a accomodative monetary 
policy will, of course, lead to a depreciation of the 
currency concerned following the reasoning of the m o d e l . 
An alternative view that could also explain the strength of 
the currency is a simple capital flow approach. Given a 
comparable political and economical envoronment between 
two countries, capital will always flow form a place where 
a lower yield is obtained to another where it could earn a 
higher yield. Therefore, there is no doubt the the place 
v/ith higher interest rates will always have a stronger 
currency. 
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Given the model developed above, the extent to which the 
price level is affected by the interest rate depends on two 
factors ； 
1. How the money supply of the country is manipulated 
A contraction of the money supply will bring down the 
price level. This can be explained if we consider money as 
one of the commodities that we can hold. A reduction in 
the money supply implies that money becomes a scarce 
resource relative to other commodities. Thus the "price" of 
money goes up relative to the other commodities ( i.e. 
general price level decreased ). 
2. The sensitivity of demand of money to the interest rate 
In the model, this sensitivity is represented by the 
parameter "h"• "h" will have a value greater than zero. 
If the value of "h" tends to zero, that means the effect of 
a change in interest rate is negligible. The greater the 
value of "h", the greater is the effect of the interest 
rate on the change of demand for real m o n e y . 
Finally, the effect of a change in income level on the 
price level can also be extracted out from the m o d e l . When 
the income level increases, certeris paribas, the demand 
for real money is also higher as people now have moire inoney 
to spend and they will spend more to upgrade their standard 
of living. To keep the money market in equilibrium, either 
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the real supply of money is increased to cope with their 
need or the interest rate is raised to lower their 
incentive to purchase. In real life, it is most probable 
that the central bank will take restrictive action to 
prevent the price level soaring. 
The effect of changing income on the demand for real money 
is also governed by the sensitivity ratio "k" given in the 
model. If "k" tends to zero, the effect of changing income 
is negligible. Otherwise, the higher the value of "h", the 
greater is the effect of changing income on the demand for 




Incorporating the above theories to the analysis, the steps 
to be followed are ； 
1. Determining the sensitivity of demand of money to a 
change of interest rate ( h ). 
As the analysis will focus on the the change in monetary 
intervention on the exchange rate, therefore to simplify 
the analysis, it is assumed that the level of income 
remains unchanged. That means the relation equating supply 
and demand for real money will become : 
M/P = C - hi ( 3.1 ) 
The sensitivity ratio h is determined by computing the 
1 
following figures of West Germany : 
M i CPI p 
1986 8.3 4 -0.1 0.999 
1987 7.1 4 0.2 1.000998 
1988 6.4 4 1.3 1.0140 
1989 5.6 5.5 2.8 1.0424 
1990 5.0 7.5 2.8 1.07159 
1 
Global Perspective. Jan 1990, Morgan Stanley & Co Inc. 
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Results of simple regression from the above observations 
are : 
h = 0.72397 
Standard error = 0.2707 
C = 10.01477 
Standard error of M/P � 0.834355 
R^ = 0.70451 
No. of observation = 5 
Degree of freedom = 3 
1 
Therefore, the relation can be rewritten as : 
M/P = 10.01477 - 0.72397 ( i ) 
2. By making use of the above relationship, the effect of 
changing monetary policy ( i.e. changing interest rate and 
changing money supply ) on the price level is determined. 
3. Assuming the price level of the United States remains 
unchanged, the impact of the changing price level resulting 
from the GEMU on the real dollar-Deutschemark rate is 
determined. 
In applying the model developed above to study the impact 
of GEMU on the dollar-Deutschemark rate, two scenarios are 
1 
Although the degree of observation is low, however with 




1. If a tightening policy is adopted by the Bundesbank 
2.工f no special monetary policy is adopted 
Before the two scenarios are dicussed, we need to assess 
first the possible impact of the GEMU on the German money 
supply and interest rate. 
First of all, consider the balance of payments flow. The 
actual level of Deutschemarks depends on the returns 
obtainable on the Deutschemark asset relative to those 
elsewhere. The fact that the real return on financial 
assets is already high in Germany should help the 
Deutschemark to remain generally firm. 
It is not the prospective real return on the financial 
assets that will support the Deutschemark. With such 
large supplies of cheap labour available in East Germany, 
the prospective real return on physical investment is also 
h i g h . 
Over the decades, capital flows have varied as the current 
account has moved from a deficit at the time of the second 
oil price hike to record surplus during the recent European 
capital investment boom ( Exhibit 3 )• The collapse of the 
German bond market after announcement of the GEMU means 
that the prospective real returns on German bonds are now 
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becoming attractive relative to their historical 
relationship with those in comparable markets, as long as 
inflation does not rise sharply in Germany. 
A comparison of real interest rates and bond yields in 
Germany and other markets provides strong evidence that the 
real returns obtainable on Deutschemark paper have risen 
significantly compared to their averages in the second half 
of the 1980s ( Exhibit 4 )• The comparisons are 
particularly favourable against the two most important 
alternative currencies, the US dollar and the Japanese yen, 
where on the basis of an inflation rate of 3 % in Germany 
the prospective real return differences are between 1.5 % 
and nearly 3 % higher than they have been on average in 
recent years. 
The threat of inflation arises in two main w a y s . First, 
there is the extra pressure on production capacity exerted 
by the sudden conversion of the excess liquidity in 
East Germany into Deutschemarks. Second, there is pressure 
on resources implied by the large scale investment required 
to modernise the East German infrastructure and economy. 
The first source of inflation pressure is relatively 
trivial and manageable. The second threat is more serious. 
The inflationary concern at the moment stems to a large 
extent from the unusually strong demand and capacity 
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pressure which already exists. 
It is estimated that East Germany held some 150 billion 
Ostraarks in accumulated savings ( with a further 20 billion 
cash in ciirculation ) before the unity. These have been 
built up to a large extent because of price controls which 
have kept down the price of necessities, and the absence 
of quality consumer goods to purchase. On converting into 
Deutschemarks, these savings would be used to buy West 
German produced consumer goods, adding to demand pressure. 
The impact of this effect is even greater when the 
conversion rate was set at 1:1. At this rate there would 
be an addition of around 14 % to the West German money 
supply ( M3 ). There was considerable political pressure 
t〇 adopt a rate of 1:1, as a means to maximising the 
purchasing power of East Germans and minimising the exodus 
to the West. But it could also be devastating for the 
East German economy, leaving it completely uncompetitive 
in world markets； unemployment will soar and output would 
be extremely depressed. 
However, there are other reasons to suppose that the 
inflationary impact in West German liquidity into 
Deutschemark will be limited : 
1. Prices will rise rapidly in East Germany, as the 
authorities must allow de-regulation, and remove subsides, 
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at the same time of currency union. If the price level 
doubled, for example, consumer spending would rise by 160 
1 
billion Ostmarks given the current pattern of expenditure 
一 enough to absorb the accumulated savings even at a 1:1 
conversion rate. Much would depend on how quickly wages 
rose, and it would be important to restrain wage gains so 
that competitiveness is not further undermined. There 
would almost certainly then be a need to run down 
accumulated savings to maintain basic living standards, as 
real income were eroded, minimising the extent of spill-
over into demand in West Germany. 
2. There are numerous way in which East German liquidity 
can be absorbed. Houses and flats can be sold to their 
occupiers, with a clause preventing resale for a certain 
period; this would in addition provide an incentive for 
East Germans to stay in the East. Industry could be 
progressively privatised, with shares sold to residents. 
A further option is to issue DM-denominated "renewal 
bonds" to East German residents, in a non-marketable form 
and of a reasonable long term maturity, say five years. 
As an incentive, the "renewal bonds" houses and shares 
could be sold at a conversion rate of 1:1, with in all 
1 
Global Perspective. Jan 1990, Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc. 
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cases a much less attractive rate such as 5:1 being 
offered. A mechanism to prevent borrowing against these 
assets as collateral would also have to be implemented. 
3. Now that East Germany has a convertible currency, the 
demand for non-domestic products will not be confined to 
West German goods. Japanese televisions and Italian shoes 
could be just as much in demand as in BMWs, and maybe even 
more so since they will be more affordable in what will 
remain a relatively poor region for some time. Productivity 
of domestic inciustiries would also be improved in the longer 
run under introduction of new competitors. 
Yet if the cost needed to modernise East Germany is 
considered, then the threat of inflation is liable to be 
greater. During the proposed reunification, the Bonn 
government estimated that the cost of financing German 
reunification would come to around 50 billion Deutschemarks 
( a b o u t $ 33 billion ) per year. At the same time, 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl promised that “ no one will have to 
pay for reunification" because a surge in tax revenues due 
to the robust economic growth that will develop from a 
. 1 
united Germany will make it unnecessary to raise taxes. 
1 
Financial Digest. Vol XXVII ( Nov 1990 ), Manufacturers 
Hanover Corp. 
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However, with the cost of German unification soaring well 
above the original estimates - private economists now think 
that it may take from $600 billion to $ 1 trillion over the 
1 
next ten years to rebuild what was once East Germany. 
Worse-than—expected economic and environmental conditions 
in the five eastern states will not only mean less tax 
revenue from the East, but will also require additional 
government spending by the West. 
Because of the extra strain that financing unification will 
place on the public sector, Bonn projected an all German 
federal deficit of almost 67 billion Deutschemarks in 1990, 
more than three times the the 20 billion mark shortfall 
that West Germany posted in 1989. However the Bundesbank 
thinks that even this estimate may be too low. The German 
central bank expects that the all German budget deficit 
will reach 100 billion Deutschemarks ( equivalent to 
more than four percent of West Germany's economy ) and 
will climb even higher to 130 billion Deutschemarks in 
1991. In fact, many private economists believe that the 
2 
short fall in 1991 could exceed 140 billion Deutschemarks. 
One reason for the sharper-than-expected deterioration in 
the economy of what was once East Germany is the rejection 
1,2 
Financial Digest. Vol XXV工工（Nov 1990 ), Manufacturers 
Hanover Corp. 
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by the East Germans of their own shoddy products. Now they 
are buying their" new cars, radios, televisions and video 
recorders from West Germany. In addition, rather than set 
up shops in the east, the West Germans are finding it easier 
just to sell their products there. As a result, West German 
retail sales soared by almost 11 percent in volume terms in 
August 1980 from a year ago, following a 14 percent increase 
‘ 1 
in July. With most of East German demand being satisfied by 
West German products, industrial production in East Germany 
plunged by over 40 percent in August 1990 from the same 
month a year ago. 
The faltering East German economy, in turn, has forced a 
larger than expected number of people to join the 
unemployment lines. The number of unemployed workers jumped 
to almost 445, 000 in September from barely 100,000 in June 
1990, bringing the East German unemployment rate from 1.6 
percent in the month before German monetary and economic 
unification was implemented to five percent just three 
months later ( Exhibit 5 )• And this is even before any of 
the more than 2,000 East German firms that are not expected 
to survive free-market competition have been scrapped. So 
far, the Treuhand, the East German agency responsible for 
privatizing the state-owned companies, has avoided the 
1 
Financial Digest. Vol XXVII ( Nov 1990 ), Manufacturers 
Hanover Corp. 
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unpleasant task of deciding which firms are not v i a b l e . 
Once these companies undergo realignment, the number of 
unemployed workers will soar even higher, possibly to as 
many as two million, one-fourth of East Germany's 
working force. As a result, the East German economy is 
expected to contract by around 10 percent in inflation-
adjusted terms in the early 90s. 
Higher than expected unemployment is not only boosting 
government outlays for social benefits, but is also 
reducing employee contribution to health, social security 
and pension funds, requiring the public sector to cover 
huge shortfalls in these areas. As a result, total welfare 
payment are expected to reach almost 20 billion 
Deutschemarks in 1990 and 30 billion Deutschemarks in 1991. 
Welfare benefits are not the only costs that are soaring by 
the day. Bonn has also promised to honor East Germany's 
trade contracts with Eastern Europe. Originally estimated 
at three billion Deutschemarks, the cost of these 
guarantees is now expected to be as high as six billion 
Deutschemarks. At the same time, with East Germany's 
roads, railroad, telephone system and pollution problems 
even worse than anticipated, the money needed for infra-
structure and cleaning up the environment is growing 
rapidly. 
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Bills from abroad will be coming in, too. In order to win 
its endorsement for German unification, Bonn promised the 
Soviet Union 15 billion Deutschemarks to cover the cost of 
Soviet troop withdrawal from East Germany. What is more, 
in order to demonstrate that a United Germany will fulfill 
its international obligations, the government has pledged 
over three billion Deutschemarks for the American led 
military operation in the Gulf and for economic aid to 
1 
Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. 
Economic research released in late 1990 which forecast the 
all-German economic strength in 1991 can give a clearer 
picture on how things will go. Although statistical 
problems are still severe, the estimates from the eastern 
part of the country are now converging to consensus levels 
and start to look reliable. 
According to these analyses, first of all, consider the 
• 2 
size of economy in 1990 : 
1 
Financial Digest. Vol XXVII ( Nov 1990 ), Manufacturers 
Hanover Corp. 
2 
Financial Market Research. ( Oct 1990 ), Manufacturers 
Hanover Corp. 
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West East Total 
Employment (mil) 28.3 8.7 37.0 
Unemployed (mil) 1.9 0.25 2.15 
Unemployment rate (%) 7.〇 3.0 6.0 
Short-term workers ('1000) 60 830 890 
GNP (bil DM) 2428 244 2672 
GNP per worker (DM '1000) 85.7 27.9 12.1 
Public sector 
expenditures (bil DM) 1098 158 1256 
Public sector 
deficit (bil DM) 58 14 72 
Household savings (bil DM) 201 0 201 
Disposable income (bil DM) 1496 172 1668 
The GNP weight of the East is thus 9.1 % of the t o t a l . GNP 
per worker, a proxy for productivity, is supposedly three 
times as high in the West which reflects the East's low 
capital intensity, the high degree of autarcy and a product 
mix largely unsuited for the world m a r k e t . 
For the year 1991, forecast of the analysis reveals that 
employment in the East falls form 8.72 million to 7.0 
million, while short-term work rises from 830,000 to 
1,750,000 ( which is really the unemployment on the job )• 
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The East‘s GDP per hour worked rises by no less than 26.5 % 
in 1991, a result of the lay-offs and, less importantly, an 
increase of capital spending by 19 %• Imports will 
increase much faster than exports ( 14% vs 8% ), and 
domestic demand considerably faster than GNP ( 7% vs 5.5 % 
) � G e r m a n y will be a strong supporter of other country's 
growth - since foreign growth is generally sluggish, the 
additional demand will not have any inflationary a f f e c t s . 
The current account deficit of East Germany rises from 51.5 
billion Deutschemarks in 1990 ( equivalent to 21.1 % of GNP 
) t o 76.5 % billion Deutschemark ( 33 % of GNP ) 一 this is 
the miriToir image of the gigantic capital flows which have 
begun moving east. The current account surplus of the 
united Germany falls to 16.5 billion Deutschemarks compared 
to 109.5 billion Deutschemark's surplus recorded by the 
W e s t in 1990. Capital exports which used to go w e s t and 
south are now going east presumably because of better 
return there. Soon Germany, being a quasi-developing 
country, may run current account d e f i c i t s . 
Assuming a 3% annual productivity growth in the W e s t , the 
East may be able to catch up with the West within 10 years 
if its annual productivity growth is 15 %. This requires a 
long-term investment boom there once the effects of the 
lay-offs are g o n e . However, given the low starting point 
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in the East, overall GNP growth will probably be much 
higher than West German growth in the past decade, by 
around 1.2 to 1.5 % per annum ( under ceteiris paribus 
assumption ). 
Gross wages per worker are forecast to rise by 6.5 % and 
24.5 % respectively in the two parts of the country. For 
many years, East German wages will increase in step with 
productivity or somewhat faster, depending on inflation. 
Otherwise, internal migration would rise again. For 
Germany as a whole, gross wages per worker may increase 
1CK5 % in 1991 ( 8 % in 1990 ) , which is below the 
productivity growth of 12 %. Unit labor costs will thus 
fall again and alleviate some of the pressure of inflation. 
Public sector revenues are seen to expand by 6.1 % in the 
West and by 25.6 % in the East ( 8.5 % over all )• but 
total expenditures will be up 9•6 % which means a deficit 
of 90.5 billion Deutschemarks, after 71.5 billion 
Deutschemarks this year ( Excluding Social Security 
surplus, the deficit would rather be 120 billion 
Deutschemarks ). 
Given the assumption of an oil price of US$ 25, an 
unchanged real exchange rate; falling unit labor costs and 
real GNP growth of only 1.5 %, inflation is seen to be 
rising to 4 % in 1991, i.e. by more than a full percentage 
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point. 
Other factors that suggest inflation should not be too 
great after the re-unification include : 
1. The entire investment in East Germany will not be 
entirely undertaken by West Germany. As economic reforms 
are implemented and with the assurance of a convertible 
currency, other countries will be only too anxious to 
invest in East Germany to take advantage of the potential 
returns. 
2. Some of the investment by West Germany in the East 
will be diverted from other areas 一 both within the Federal 
Republic and from countries such as Spain - where the 
potential return is perceived to be lower; this will limit 
the increase in net new investment. 
3. Over time, funds for investment will be generated 
within East Germany as the economy becomes more 
productive. Admittedly, all the burden will initially fall 
upon the West, but the investment required to improve the 
East German capital stock and what will actually take place 
are not necessarily one and the same. 
To sum up the above studies, the effect of monetary re-
unification on money market variables, i.e. the nominal 
money supply and interest rates, are as follows : 
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1. Money Supply 
The growth of money supply will be lower than 14 % , which 
is the worst case under a conversion rate of 1:1 between 
Deutschemark and Ostmark. It is assumed that the nominal 
iiioney supply will grow in three years' time at 5 % if an 
optimistic view is taken. This is based on the estimate 
when the most favourable conversion rate 5:1 is adopted. 
2. Interest Rate 
As the cost of financing the reconstruction of East 
Germany is huge, the interest rate is likely to go up. A 
higher interest rate is necessary to absorb excess 
liquidity in the market. A higher interest rate will also 
be resulted as Germany needs to raise fund from internal 
and external sources to finance the restructuring. 
Bundesbank has already raised the discount rate and Lombard 
rate and probably they need to raise the rate again as the 
cost incurred seems to be a lot exceeding the expectation. 
The short term interest rate will be testing 10 % in the 
coining three years which reflect the shortage of liquidity 
in the restructuring process. 
Given the possible change in nominal monetary supply and 
interest rates as above, the following two scenarios are 
discussed : 
1. No tightening policy adopted by the Bundesbank 
2. Tightening policy adopted by the Bundesbank 
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Scenario 1 � Tightening Policy not adopted 
If there is no tightening policy adopted by the Bundesbank, 
that means no special measure is used to absorb excess 
money growth and the money supply will remain high. 
Given the relation of money market equilibrium, 
M/P = C - hi ( 3 . 1 ) 
If the demand for real money remains unchanged, then, in 
order to restore equilibrium in the money market, the price 
level will go up by the same proportion as the nominal 
money supply so that the real money supply ( M/P ) remains 
unchanged. 
Therefore if the nominal money supply is increased by 14 %, 
the price level will be increased exactly by 14 % if the 
real demand for money remains unchanged. By the relation 
of the purchasing power parity, the real exchange rate of 
Deutschemarks will be depreciated by 14 %. 
Now consider the demand side of the money market 
equilibrium. The interest rate is seen to be on an up-
trend after GEMU as the demand for fund to re-construct 
East Germany put an upward pressure on the cost of m o n e y . 
Interest rates will probably be settled at 10% in the 
coming years. The effect of a rise of interest rate from 
5.5 % in 1989 to 10 % on the demand of real money is given 
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by ： 
Demand of real money = C 一 hi 
% Change in demand for real money 
= h ( i i - 12 )/( C -hii ) 
= 0 . 7 2 3 9 7 ( 5.5 - 10 )/( 10.01477 - 0.72397*5.5 ) 
= 5 4 % decreased 
The effect on the price level for such an interest rate 
increase, given an unchanged nominal money supply at M , in 
order to restore equilibrium, will be given as : 
% Change in price level 
= M { l/(c一hip) — 1/ (C-hi^ ) ) * (c一hii ) / M 
� 117 % increased 
That will imply a depreciation of 117 % in the real 
exchange rate if we consider the effect of interest rate 
increase alone. 
The combined effect of a 14 % increase in nominal money 
supply and an increase by 4.5% in interest rate on price 
level will be : 
117 - 54 = 63 % increase in price level 
Therefore the ultimate result if the Bundesbank does not 
impose any tightening monetary policy will be a 
depreciation by 63 % in the real exchange rate of 
Deutschemark against US dollar. 
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Scenario 2 � Tightening policy adopted 
If the Bundesbank adopts a contractory monetary policy to 
tackle the threat an upheaval in inflation pressure, then 
it is likely that in the long run, nominal supply can be 
trimined down. Yet in doing so, interest rates should be 
kept at an relatively high level as the reconstruction of 
East Germany will not likely be finished in three to five 
years. Demand for reconstruction funds will be tight 
within the coming three years that we are considering. 
Furthermore, globally speaking, the demand for funds is 
also high if the financing of re—building of Kuwait after 
the Gulf War is considered. At the same time, many 
economists are inclined to believe the recession in the 
United States will be ended fairly quickly and consumer 
confidence resumed in a short time. Therefore the US 
interest rate will soon be stablized and gradually rise. 
Thus, the German interest rate has no reason to go down 
and, instead, needs to go up further to guard the country 
from the threat of inflation following an excess demand for 
goods and commodities. 
Assuming that the interest rate is kept at 12 % and the 
nominal money supply is increased by only 7 % compared to 
the 1989 level, ( which is a rather optimistic estimate 
given the lowest nominal money growth is at 5 % if the 
Deutschemark against Ostmark conversion rate is set at 
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1 ： 5 ), the resulting effect on price level will be : 
For the year 1989, let nominal money supply as M 
interest rate at 5.5% 
price level at P 
then, 
M/P � 10.01477 + 0.72397 ( 5.5 ) 
= 1 3 . 9 9 6 6 0 5 
If in 1993 money supply increased by 7 % as 1989 
and interest rate at 12 % 
price level at P 
then, 
1.07M/P = 10.01477 + 0.72397 (12 ) 
= 1 8 . 7 0 2 4 1 
Therefore the percentage change in price level between P^ 
and will be : 
( P 9 - Pi ) • 100 % 
= 2 0 % decreased 
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The resulting impact on the real dollar Deutschemark 




According to the analysis, unless a strictly tightening 
monetary policy is adopted, the real exchange rate of the 
dollar against the Deutschemark is likely to be depreciated 
by about 63 %• Whereas if the tightening policy is 
adopted, the real exchange rate will appreciate by about 
20 %• The magnitude of the change depends on the resulting 
growth of nominal money supply and the interest rate 
following the German re-unification. To G e r m a n y , a 
stronger exchange rate is , of course, desirable. On the 
one hand, its capacity to repay foreign debt is greatly 
enhanced if the Deutschemark remains strong. On the other 
hand, a strong exchange rate will result in more 
favourable terms of trade to Germany. It is clear from the 
above analysis that unless the Bundesbank has a firm grip 
on the monetary policy, there is no way that they can 
expect a strong real exchange rate. Therefore, investors 
should read clearly the intention of the Bundesbank and 
determine the extent of the tightening policy that is u s e d . 
Should a firm tightening policy be adopted, the model tells 
us that it will be advisable to hold Deutschemarks against 
the other currency. 
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Yet the model used above would be a rather simplified model 
as there are some other factors that can affect the 
exchange rate. In the model, we consider only the money 
market and seek to find an equilibrium real exchange rate 
that will clear the market. However in Economics, in order 
that general equilibrium is achieved, the asset market 
should also be in equilibrium. Therefore if the 
equilibrium real exchange rate is concerned, factors that 
affect the asset market should also be taken account of, 
like the current account, investment spending, government 
expenditure etc. Moreover, the employment level is 
another factor to be considered should any government 
policy be imposed. For example, if the unemployment rate 
is high, then perhaps the central bank has to re-think of 
employing tightening policy as bidding up the interest rate 
will discourage investment incentive and devastate the 
unemployment situation. 
Furthermore, in the model, an important assumption made is 
that the economic conditions of the other country ( in this 
case, the United States ) remains unchanged. In reality, 
the other country will also be undergoing economic boom and 
recession and this will affect the real exchange rate 
between the two countries. Take the United States as an 
example. The country is said to have been in recession 
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since late 1990 and economists are expecting this recession 
1 
will end quite quickly. Therefore it could happen that 
in the coining three years, the United States will be 
booming economy and as a result the relative strength of 
the US dollar against the other currencies will be 
increased. 
Finally, another point worth mentioning is that Germany 
itself is a member of the EMS ( European Monetary System ), 
in which the relative exchange rate of a member against 
other members will be kept in a band to ensure stability in 
the EMS. The impact of re-unification of Germany to the 
EMS still need to be studied. Furthermore, with the United 
Kingdom going to join the EMS in the near future, there 
could be re-alignment in the EMS and the Deutschemark 
exchange rate is likely to be affected. 
In conclusion, it can only be said that up till n o w , there 
is not a satisfactory model that can give a genuine 
forecast on how the exchange rate will go as there are 
tremendous factors that can have effect on it. This paper 
presents one view but definitely not the whole story. 
1 





1. On the designated day, all East German borrowings, 
including liabilities from current transactions, should 
be converted into Deutschemarks at a rate of 
one-to-two. Excluded would be individual bank accounts 
of up to OM 2,000.- per persons, which would be 
converted at a rate of one-to-one. These accounts would 
be immediately accessible. 
2. In the light of the necessary cut in savings of above 
OM 2,000.-, the West German Government should suggest 
in negotiations with East Germany that savers be 
guaranteed a stake in fiduciary funds held by East 
Germany and in holdings which would be privatised later. 
3. The accord between the two states should also guarantee 
that in regard to monetary policy in East Germany, only 
the Bundesbank law and Bundesbank regulations would 
apply. This includes the need to be able to implement 
in East Germany all monetary policy decisions made by 
the Bundesbank central council. 
4. To fulfil its responsibilities, the Bundesbank must be 
47 
able to open a provisional administrative office in 
Berlin and about 15 other branch offices in East 
Germany. 
5. The "West German" coitm\e;rcial banking law needs to be 
introduced in East Germany, allowing West German and 
foreign commercial banks to open offices. Regulations 
on interest rates and foreign exchange limits need 
to be removed. 
6. Borrowing by East German public authorities needs to 
be limited. 
Source : The Financial Times. April 3, 90, p p . l. 
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EXHIBIT 2 
ESTIMATED PPPs AND EXCHANGE RATES 
1980-1984 
Year ！ Exchange Rate 丨 PPP 
1970 ！ 3.66 丨 2.81 
1971 ！ 3.49 ！ 2.88 
1972 � 3.19 � 2.91 
1973 � 2.67 � 2.94 
1974 ！ 2.59 丨 2.87 
1975 丨 2.46 ！ 2.79 
1976 丨 2.52 ！ 2.73 
1977 � 2.32 � 2.67 
1978 ！ 2.01 ！ 2.59 
1979 � 1.83 � 2.49 
1980 ！ 1.82 丨 2.37 
1981 丨 2.26 ！ 2.27 
1982 丨 2.43 ！ 2.22 
1983 ！ 2.55 ！ 2.19 
1984 丨 2.85 •； 2.17 
Source ： Michael Ward, Purchasing Power Parities and Real 
Expenditures in the OECD. OECD 1985 
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EXHIBIT 3 ( A ) 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, WEST GERMANY 
( D M / B I L L I O N ) 
Year Current Long Term Short Term Unclassified Balance 
account capital capital 
1979 -10 12 -3 -4 -5 
1980 -25 6 -6 -2 -28 
1981 -8 8 -3 n/a -2 
1982 12 -14 11 一 6 3 
1983 14 -1 -11 1 1 
1984 28 -20 -18 6 -3 
1985 48 -13 -42 8 2 
1986 85 34 -114 1 6 
1987 81 -23 -18 1 42 
1988 85 -85 -36 1 -35 
1989 102 -17 -90 -14 一 19 




EXHIBIT 3 ( B ) 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS -
CAPITAL FLOW 
Dm/billion 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Long Term Capital 34 -23 -85 -17 
Direct Investment : 
Outflow -21 -16 -18 -21 
Inflow 2 3 3 10 
Stocks : 
Outflow -5 - -18 -9 
Inflow 15 -2 6 22 
Bonds : 
Outflow -16 -25 -55 -45 
Inflow 59 35 2 26 
Other - 1 -18 -4 一 
Short term capital -114 -18 -36 -90 
Balance of 
capital flows -80 -41 -121 -107 
===== ===== —r———— —— 




COMPARISON OF REAL TEN YEAR 
BOND YIELD ( % ) 
Year Germany US Japan UK Switzerland 
1985 4.6 7.0 4.1 5.0 1.3 
1986 6.1 5.8 4.4 6.5 3.6 
1987 5.7 4.7 4.4 5.4 2.7 
1988 5.2 4.7 4.0 4.9 2.1 
1989 4.0 3.7 3.0 2.5 2.0 
1985/9 A v . 5.1 5.2 4.0 4.9 2.3 
1st Quarter 
1990 5.9 4.4 4.5 5.3 3.9 
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